Steubenville

Rape is rape is rape. No matter how you twist it, turn it, paint it, or dress it up, it is still rape. It does not matter one iota if the lady raped was a prostitute, it is still rape.

Men have this preconceived  notion they are entitled to a womans body no matter what. If she enters a room, and a man is aroused, then he should be allowed to take her right then and there.

Ever talk to a woman about some of the men she has encountered? Most of them, it seems, want to get their jollies and to hell with her. Why? Because men can be self absorbed assholes.

Since the day man dropped out of a tree and lived in a cave, he has thought of himself as this super dude who, because he has a penis, should rule the roost. He only wants what he wants and nothing more. He wants to screw every woman he can but wants no part of the children he helps create.

Ever see most men when they encounter a woman with kids? He would much rather beat on an atomic bomb with a hammer than acknowledge they exist. To him, the came from another man, and that somehow makes a woman "dirty".

When it comes to rape, however, to the rapist he is establishing power over the woman. He is telling her (and hopefully her sisters) he is boss hog, and he will take what he wants. Why not? It was her fault in the first place! She was there, occupying a space, and he was overcome with lust, and he could not control himself....

You get the idea. He will rationalize that it was all he fault to begin with. She wanted it because of the way she dressed, walked, looked, or she was drunk, high, and she was teasing the man. She wanted him to take her, so he did. It was not his fault, she tempted him. The spirit was willing, but the flesh was weak.

There is no excuse for rape, none. If you say an invisible deity told you to do it, then you are insane and deserve to be locked away in a rubber room someplace. If you say it was her fault, then you are a lying bastard.

There are those times the woman has lied about being raped, but they are not as commonplace as rape itself.

Rape is rape is rape and it has no place in our society.

Congress and Greed.

Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys.
P. J. O'Rourke.

It is a known fact to run a campaign, one needs scads of money. Donations from private citizens can help a candidate run for office, but it comes nowhere close to paying for offices, paid workers, advertising and day to day operations. This is true for all levels of seeking office.

Running for Congress can be very expensive and there are monied interests who are more than happy to fund a candidates campaign; the problem is the candidate becomes their property. So long as the Candidate pushes their agenda, they will keep the money flowing. Other monied interests who have the same point of view will also contribute and the Candidate finds he has many masters. If he wants to keep the faucets open, he has to vote the way they tell him to.

This is what the NRA is doing to many in Congress; behind the scenes they are telling our Congresspeople if they want money for their war chest, then they had better vote against any firearm legislation which may come their way. As of this writing, I do not have the figures as to how much money the NRA gives to select Congresspeople, but I am sure it is substantial.

Why do Congresspeople do this? Part of this is running campaigns, but the other part is just plain greed. " Greed is a bottomless pit which exhausts the person in an endless effort to satisfy the need without ever reaching satisfaction." said Erich Fromm. To many of these people, the money they receive is never enough. They must have more and they get to the point it becomes apparent they do not care where or how they get it. They become detached from society at large and their constituents are just little ants who keep on voting them into office. They may do something for a photo-op or a feel good story on the news, but in reality they do not have the voters interests at heart unless there is a groundswell of dissatisfaction which threatens them. 

When the threat becomes a clear and present danger to the life they are living, they will turn on their corporate masters, but will team up with others.

Campaign reform is needed but only Congress has the power or authority to do this  so do not expect change any time soon.

The Battlle of Balls Bluff, Part One

Near the Virginia city of Leesburg, there stands a small National Cemetery in which only one headstone is marked. This site marks the Battle of Balls Bluff; not a large battle but still a stinging defeat for the Union Army so soon after the Battle of First Manassas.

The Battle of Ball's Bluff was a Union debacle that occurred during a period of quiet in the Eastern theater, ensuring it a great deal of publicity. Southerners celebrated it as a follow-up thrashing to First Manassas, while Northerners bemoaned yet another defeat in northern Virginia. As such, the little fight would have major implications, particularly for the Union.


Despite traditional historical interpretations, the engagement was not the result of a preplanned Federal attempt to take Leesburg. It was rather an accident that evolved out of the carelessness of an inexperienced infantry officer who reported seeing something that was not there.

Captain Chase Philbrick's Company H, 15th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, was picketing Harrison's Island, an island 2 miles long and 300-400 yards wide that bisects the Potomac River at Ball's Bluff. The bluff itself, some 35 miles northwest of Washington, D.C., runs for about 600 yards along the Virginia shore, rising steeply from the 50-yard-wide flood plain that separates it from the river.

On October 20, Philbrick's commander, Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone, whose Maryland-based division was rather grandly known as the Corps of Observation, began moving troops around to give the impression that he was about to cross in force in response to an order from Army of the Potomac commander Maj. Gen. George McClellan that he should conduct 'a slight demonstration' to see what effect it might have on the enemy.

McClellan's belief that the Confederates might have abandoned Leesburg spawned that order, and on October 16-17, the Rebels had indeed left the town. Regional Confederate commander Colonel Nathan G. 'Shanks' Evans had been keeping a wary eye on the growing Federal forces across the river. The threat seemed to grow on October 9, when Union Brig. Gen. George McCall crossed his 12,000-man division at Chain Bridge and established a camp at Langley, Va., 25 miles east of Leesburg.

 A week earlier, on October 3, Colonel Edward D. Baker's large 'California Brigade' reinforced General Stone's division, bringing the Union numbers to something over 10,000 men near Ball's Bluff. Baker and his brigade were a story unto themselves. The four regiments were made up mostly of Pennsylvania men, but had been tagged the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th California because Baker had long been affiliated with California and wanted it formally represented in the Eastern army. Baker was, in fact, a senator from Oregon and a close friend of Abraham Lincoln from the prewar political arena. So close were the two that the president had named his second son Edward Baker Lincoln.

Evans interpreted McCall's and Baker's movements to mean an imminent advance on Leesburg. The town was strategically located on the Confederacy's Potomac River frontier due to several militarily usable fords across the river and two working ferry sites. Whoever controlled the river there controlled invasion routes into Virginia. Several fortifications had been built to protect the area, including Fort Evans along the Edwards Ferry road, some three miles south of Leesburg. Evans, quite reasonably, became concerned that he did not have enough men. His brigade numbered only 2,500 to 2,800 men, and the closest supporting troops were 25 to 30 miles away along the Bull Run line.
On the evening of October 16, on his own authority, Evans began shifting his brigade south along what is more or less today's U.S. Route 15. That night and all the next day, he moved to establish a new defensive line some eight miles south of Leesburg behind Goose Creek.

His commander, General P.G.T. Beauregard, was displeased by the move and indicated his displeasure through a sarcastic third-party message that said Beauregard 'wishes to be informed of the reasons that influenced you to take up your present position, as you omit to inform him.' Evans took the hint, and by late on October 19, his brigade returned to the town.
Federals observed Evans' southward movement and reported it to McClellan, who ordered McCall to investigate by taking his division on a reconnaissance-in-force as far west as Dranesville, about halfway between Langley and Leesburg. McCall did so on October 19. By that evening each side must have been very puzzled about the other's intentions.

General McClellan suspected a trap, thinking that Evans might be attempting to draw some of his forces forward in order to cut off and destroy them. When Evans learned that McCall was in Dranesville, he may well have thought that he had brought on the very advance that he earlier had feared.

On the morning of October 20, McCall was probing westward toward Leesburg. Evans was along another portion of Goose Creek four miles east of Leesburg and some eight or nine miles from McCall. McClellan then ordered Stone to conduct the'slight demonstration' that led to Captain Philbrick's involvement.

By the evening of October 20, Stone's demonstration was over and the Federal regiments were on their way back to their camps. In order to determine the effectiveness of the movement, he ordered Colonel Charles Devens to send a patrol across the river at Ball's Bluff. Philbrick got the assignment partly because his company was already on Harrison's Island and partly because he had led a similar patrol on the evening of October 18 that had familiarized him with the area.
Around dusk, Philbrick and a handful of volunteers using two small skiffs quietly crossed to Ball's Bluff. The patrol moved downriver along the flood plain at the base of the bluff, then up a winding path that came out just behind the current national cemetery. Philbrick's men cautiously advanced away from the river along a cart path some 10 or 12 feet wide. They crossed a large clearing and passed through some woods to open fields. A full moon had bloomed on October 18, and still provided some uncertain light.

Lieutenant Church Howe later described the patrol: 'We proceeded…three quarters of a mile or a mile from the edge of the river. We saw what we supposed to be an encampment. [There was] a row of maple trees; and there was a light on the opposite hill which shone through the trees and gave it the appearance of the camp.'Captain Philbrick took the patrol back across the river and reported the presence of 'a small camp without pickets.' General Stone called the discovery 'a very nice little military chance.' He decided to raid the camp, and the chain of errors that led to the Union debacle had begun. Captain Philbrick's inaccurate, faulty report would lead to the Battle of Ball's Bluff.
Preparations were made throughout the night and into the early hours of October 21 for a raid limited solely to the supposed camp. Indeed, General Stone specifically ordered Colonel Devens to make his raid 'and return to his present position.'

A second crossing was also planned downriver at Edwards Ferry. Stone ordered Major John Mix, an old Regular Army man commanding a battalion of the 3rd New York Cavalry, to take 30 to 35 men across the river and move out the Edwards Ferry road toward Leesburg. Mix's assignment was to draw Confederate attention away from Devens so that he would be able to conduct his raid and get safely back. Mix also was to scout the roads between the river and the main highway into Leesburg from the east (today's Route 7 East, the road down which General McCall would march should he be ordered to move on the town). Having done those things, Mix was to recross the river. Believing that he would be back in Maryland by 8:30 or 9 a.m., he ordered the regimental cooks to have breakfast ready.


Colonel Devens shuttled his raiding party, 300 men from the 15th Massachusetts, across the river in the patrol's two skiffs and a slightly larger 'Francis metallic lifeboat' that held about 15 men and was dragged across the island for their use. Some 30 to 35 men at a time could make the crossing in the three boats. Just over 100 troops from the 20th Massachusetts followed the 15th Massachusetts men. Their job was to deploy on the bluff, cover the withdrawal of Devens' men following the raid, and then recross to the island under cover of fire from infantry and two mountain howitzers stationed there.

Getting more than 400 men across the river in three small boats, in the dark and as quietly as possible, was a touchy assignment made more so by the fact that heavy rains during the previous three weeks had caused the river to rise well above normal. The shuttling of troops to the Virginia shore took most of the night.

Colonel Devens consulted with Colonel William R. Lee, who commanded the 20th Massachusetts and accompanied his 100 men to the bluff. Devens then ordered his men to the attack as soon as it was light enough to see. Sunrise that morning came at 6:26, so it may be presumed that he moved out at about 6.

Devens soon discovered that his raiding party had nothing to raid. Had he decided to return to the island at that point, the story would have ended there. General Stone, however, had given him the discretionary authority not to return immediately should he either drive the enemy easily or find that the situation was quiet and there was no threat. Colonel Devens decided to stay.

He sent Lieutenant Howe back to tell General Stone about the mistake and to request further instructions. Howe returned to the river, crossed over and rode to Edwards Ferry, reporting to Stone around 8. On hearing Howe's report, Stone decided to turn the raid back into a reconnaissance and ordered the remainder of the 15th Massachusetts to join Devens. The force then was to advance toward Leesburg to gauge the enemy's strength in the area. Howe went ahead of the reinforcements and told his commander of the new orders.

Howe's message to Stone, however, was irrelevant before it was delivered. Devens actually was making contact with the Confederates as Howe was talking to Stone. Pickets from Captain William Duff's Company K, 17th Mississippi Infantry, had briefly engaged a small patrol from the 20th Massachusetts near Smart's Mill, a mile or so north of Ball's Bluff. About four men on each side exchanged shots, then withdrew. First Sergeant William Riddle of the 20th Massachusetts was severely wounded in the elbow, the battle's first casualty.

The Mississippians sent word to Colonel Evans that Union troops were across the river, but no one from the 20th Massachusetts bothered to inform Colonel Devens of the contact. He therefore was surprised when his scouts reported Confederate troops moving toward his position.
Captain Duff gathered his 40-45 men and moved southward in order to get between the enemy and Leesburg. He encountered Devens' men near the home of Mrs. Margaret Jackson, a little north of where the camp mistakenly was reported to have been and several hundred yards from the bluff. Devens had 300 men with him, but, not knowing that he faced so few Confederates, he held most of his men in reserve and sent only Captain Philbrick's 65-man Company H forward to meet Duff, triggering a 15-minute firefight at about 8 a.m. The Southerners got the best of it, as they killed one, wounded nine and captured three of the Federals while suffering only three minor wounds themselves. Both companies withdrew, and there was a lull of about three hours while both sides fed reinforcements into the area.

The balance of Devens' 15th Massachusetts were the first Federals to arrive, and the initial Confederate reinforcements were troopers from several companies of the 4th and 6th Virginia Cavalry led by Lt. Col. Walter Jenifer. Jenifer had heard the firing, pulled together as many horsemen as he could, and ridden to the sound of the guns. Both sets of reinforcements arrived after the initial skirmish had ended.


As additional troops arrived, two more skirmishes erupted near the Jackson house. One occurred around 11:30 between the roughly 650 men of the 15th Massachusetts and a mixed force of Mississippi infantry and Virginia cavalry of about the same size. At almost every point of contact during the day, the opposing forces were fairly evenly matched, though each side reported being heavily outnumbered by the other.

A third skirmish took place around 1 p.m., after the 8th Virginia (minus one company) arrived with just under 400 men. Though larger than the previous skirmishes, it also was indecisive and was followed by a lull. By about 2, Colonel Devens, whose men had done all the fighting on the Union side thus far, decided to withdraw to the bluff, where he knew that he would have some help.
Coincidentally, Baker finally had crossed to Ball's Bluff and met Devens there at about 2:15. He approved of Devens' withdrawal and ordered him to take a position on the right of, and perpendicular to, the Federal line. The position, sometimes called a chevron formation, would have looked from the bluff like a backward 'L.' In one wing, facing west or inland, the men of the 20th had their backs to the bluff. The other wing, the 15th Massachusetts, faced south. Together they faced an open field and covered the cart path on which any troops coming into the clearing would have to march, forcing them into a crossfire. To beef up the defense, the 20th had dragged two mountain howitzers up the slope and added them to the line. A short while later, a James rifle fieldpiece was also brought up the bluff.

Baker sent two companies of his 1st California Infantry up the slope on his left front. He thought that as many as 7,000 Confederates might be there (it actually was closer to 700), but he wanted to be sure. That move resulted in those two companies meeting a portion of the 8th Virginia around 3 p.m., marking the beginning of almost continuous fighting that lasted until after dark.

Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Wistar of the 1st California claimed the Virginians 'rose up from the ground' to blast his men, who took heavy losses and fell back. Confusion within the 8th Virginia, however, caused a good portion of the regiment to break and run. Colonel Eppa Hunton apparently ordered the 8th to withdraw to a better position a short distance to the rear about the same time that the clash occurred. That order and the shock of the clash seem to have combined to create a panic in the regiment's rightward-most companies. Hunton reacted by moving the unit to the left and rear, where he spent nearly two hours reorganizing his men and getting them back into the fight.

As Hunton was moving to his left, Colonel Erasmus Burt moved his 18th Mississippi into their former place. After the men were situated, Burt almost immediately ordered them forward. Not seeing the right wing of the Federal chevron because those men were under the cover of woods and sloping ground, Burt marched directly into what Rebel cavalryman Elijah White, a local resident home on furlough and acting as a guide, later called 'the best directed & most destructive single volley I saw during the war.' More than half of the 18th Mississippi's 85 casualties that day came from that volley. Burt was one of them. Shot through the hip, he was taken into Leesburg, where he died five days later.

The Mississippians pulled back and were split into two battalions by Lt. Col. Thomas Griffin. One moved to the left and the other to the right, creating an opening of some 200 yards in the Confederate line. The Federals did not exploit that gap, and it eventually would be filled by the 17th Mississippi. As the afternoon developed, the Rebels constructed a U-shaped line that penned the Union troops in along the precipitous bluff.
Mixed companies of the 18th and 17th Mississippi Infantry anchored the left flank, with the reorganized 8th Virginia next in line. The rest of the 17th Mississippi then filled in the aforementioned gap between 4:15 and 5 p.m., and seven companies of the 18th Mississippi held down the right flank of the gray line. Company H of the 18th was on the extreme right, separated from its comrades by a ravine.

The Union troops were even less organized than their foe, as various companies and battalions of the 15th and 20th Massachusetts, the 1st California and the 42nd New York were moved to threatened areas. Other elements of the 42nd New York were the final piece in the Union puzzle, crossing over later in the day and taking an initial position roughly in the Federal center.

After Burt's mortal wounding, the fighting was almost continuous, becoming a swirl of individual company or battalion actions. One Yankee called it a fight 'made up of charges.'
The 18th Mississippi kept working around the Confederate right, assaulting out of a ravine at least five times. Each time they were repulsed. The Union cannons, though in the open, contributed to holding the line. When the vulnerable artillerymen were quickly shot down, infantrymen came forward to man the guns.

It was probably during the final assault by the 18th Mississippi on the Union left, between 4:30 and 5, that Colonel Baker was killed. Many descriptions have been left of Baker's death, though one of the most credible came from Captain Caspar Crowninshield of the 20th Massachusetts, who reported seeing Baker rallying his men when he was shot, 'got up again and then fell, struck by eight balls….' Hand-to-hand fighting occurred before Union troops could retrieve Baker's body. The colonel remains the only U.S. senator ever killed in battle.
Colonel Milton Cogswell of the 42nd New York eventually took command of the Union forces and attempted to break through the Confederate right flank. Had that been tried earlier, it might well have succeeded. But by the time the beleaguered Yanks made their charge, it was a desperate move that fell apart almost before it began.

The fight continued to rage as the Federals made other failed attempts to drive away their Rebel tormentors. Things came to a head when the 17th Mississippi, about 700 fresh troops with full cartridge boxes, and supported by much of the 18th and possibly a company of the 13th Mississippi, advanced on the worn-out Federals.After filing into the gap in the Rebel line, the 17th's commander, Colonel Winfield Scott Featherston, had his men lie down. 'No lizards ever got closer to the ground than we did,' remembered one Mississippian. The men soon rose again at Featherston's command and moved forward in the final attack that drew in troops from the other Rebel regiments around dusk.
It was too much for the pressed Yankees. Cogswell made an effort to conduct an orderly withdrawal, but it was too late. One Rebel noted, 'a kind of shiver ran through the huddled mass upon the brow of the cliff; it gave way; rushed a few steps; then, in one wide, panic-stricken herd, rolled, leaped, tumbled over the precipice!'
The Federals had nowhere to go but into the swollen river. Many of them drowned or were shot as they attempted to swim to Harrison's Island. Private William Thatcher of the 1st California swam for his life as he could hear 'balls going ploog in the water' all around him. 'I never felt so near death,' wrote a relieved G.W. Davison of the 15th Massachusetts, 'in the water, weak, and out of breath, and balls whizzing.'

Many other Federals took what cover they could at the base of the bluff and later surrendered. More than 50 percent of the Union force become casualties, making the Confederate victory as complete as any won by either side during the war.
Material in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion notes that 49 Union soldiers were killed. Regimental returns, medical records and the many reports of bodies washing ashore along the Potomac in the days following the battle make it clear, however, that the Federal death toll approached 250. The Confederates suffered fewer than 40 killed.

The primary responsibility for the Federal disaster lies with Colonel Baker. Though personally brave, he made several very careless and costly decisions that hindered rather than helped the troops he ordered into battle.

The Southern command structure also had problems resulting from confusion and casualties. Walter Jenifer, Eppa Hunton and Erasmus Burt all were in charge of the Confederate forces at some point, until Winfield Scott Featherston took command and led the climactic assault that drove the Federals into the river at the end of the day.As events played out, Colonel Evans, who remained close to the Edwards Ferry road during the fight, moved troops to Ball's Bluff at just the right times. Although his force never really outnumbered the Union troops, the pressure they applied was consistent enough to generate positive results for the Confederates despite the confusion caused by the numerous field command changes.

Ball's Bluff was considered a significant fight in 1861, but by later standards it was a mere skirmish. General Stone later described it as being 'about equal to an unnoticed morning's skirmish' in 1864. But it mattered at the time, and it had serious consequences. To the Confederates it was 'a splendid success.' For the defeated Federals, 'a very nice little military chance' became 'that cursed Ball's Bluff,' which inspired the inquiry of committees and ruined careers.

Though Baker was primarily to blame, the Republicans who controlled Washington had no desire to smear a Senate colleague and friend of the president. Therefore, the ax landed on Stone's neck. The congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War was formed partly in response to the debacle.

Stone, who had been a rising star in the Union Army, was grilled by committee members and eventually imprisoned for 189 days, although no charges were ever filed against him. After his release, he served in the Western theater before resigning from the Army in September 1864.

The Joint Committee existed throughout the war, a shadow over the shoulder of Union generals who did not function precisely in the manner the politicians thought they should.

And what of Sergeant Donaldson? Attempting to work his way downriver late in the day, he was captured and spent the night with more than 500 of his comrades in the yard of the Loudoun County Courthouse in Leesburg. Sent to a prison in Richmond, he was aided by his brother, Lieutenant John Donaldson of the 22nd Virginia, who got him released on the condition that he would not leave the city. He was even offered a job in the Confederate postal service, but refused.

In February 1862, Donaldson was exchanged and returned to the war, eventually becoming a captain in the 118th Pennsylvania. He survived the war and attended the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, dying at his home in 1928.

Thermoplyae and Misinformation on Gun Control

The above image is what you could call the latest salvo in the Gun Control Issue.

Yes, the Persians and the Spartans (with their Greek Allies) did face off at the narrow pass,  but Historians feel that although Xerxes Army totalled 2.5 million troops, he landed only 250,000 at the narrow pass (300,000 counting the camp followers). Leonidas, leader of the Spartans, was  able to  field a force of 7500 troops; 300 of which were Spartans.

Tactically, the pass at Thermopylae was ideally suited to the Greek style of warfare. A hoplite phalanx would be able to block the narrow pass with ease, with no risk of being outflanked by cavalry. In the pass, the phalanx would have been very difficult to assault for the more lightly armed Persian infantry. The major weak point for the Greeks was the mountain track which led across the highland parallel to Thermopylae, and which would allow their position to be outflanked. Although probably unsuitable for cavalry, this path could easily be traversed by the Persian infantry (many of whom were versed in mountain warfare). Leonidas was made aware of this path by local people from Trachis, and he positioned a detachment of Phocian troops there in order to block this route.

 From a strategic point of view, by defending Thermopylae, the Greeks were making the best possible use of their forces. As long as they could prevent further Persian advance into Greece, they had no requirement to seek a decisive battle, and could thus remain on the defensive. Moreover, by defending two constricted passages (Thermopylae and Artemisium), the Greeks' inferior numbers became less problematic. Conversely, for the Persians the problem of supplying such a large army meant that the Persians could not remain in the same place for too long. The Persians must therefore retreat or advance; and advancing required the pass of Thermopylae to be forced.

 Today, the pass is not near the sea but is several miles inland because of sedimentation in the Malian Gulf. The old track appears at the foot of hills around the plain, flanked by a modern road. Recent core samples indicate that the pass was only 100 meters wide and the waters came up to the gates; "Little do the visitors realize that the battle took place across the road from the monument." The pass still is a natural defensive position to modern armies, and British Commonwealth forces in World War II made a defense in 1941 against the Nazi invasion metres from the original battle field.

Since the shooting at Newtown, the NRA and others have besieged the media with what they feel is a full frontal assault on owning weapons of all types. Many will use historical events to try and bolster their arguments. The arguments are presented in such a way as to say this event happened but they leave out details (facts are such pesky things).

The Persians were not out to just disarm the Greeks and their Allies, they wanted to take over all of Greece especially after their defeat at Marathon.

Yes, the Persians were able to defeat the Greeks and Spartans at Thermopylae but that was because a Greek traitor showed Xerxes a route (mentioned above) that enabled the Persians to flank and attack from the rear the Greeks.

Many weapons enthusiasts feel, because of mis-information, they could hold off an assault by Government Forces should they come for their weapons. Custer thought he could dislodge Indians from their lands and wound up being defeated. Custer thought he and his 700 men could take on 800 Native Americans  but on the day of the Battle the 7th Cavalry faced 1500 to 2000 tribesmen from Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho, led by several major war leaders, including Crazy Horse and Gall, inspired by the visions of Sitting Bull. It did not help Custer being well armed; what helped the Natives was numerical superiority.

If the Government ever came after peoples weapons, they could do it because of numerical and technological superiority. Firearm owners contend members of the Military would be loathed to attack civilians, but when faced with a choice (Court Martial or do as you are told) the majority will follow orders.

The gun lobby knows it can play on peoples fears like a guitar and posters like this only serve that purpose.

Understanding the Brain and Mental Illness.

The finger pointing has begun and excuses are flying around like aircraft at O'Hare Airport. Some are saying "Put prayer back in school, that will fix things", others are saying, "Put more cops in schools". Yeah, that will really work considering some places have had to cut back on their First Responders because the tax base has shrunk. Many are saying, "Arm Principals and Teachers"; oh that is really good. Having teacher walk around teaching class wearing a .45 with a round chambered. While we are at it, why not give Teachers Aides AK-47's with large clips and bayonets.

Many are citing mental illness as the culprit.

Diagnosing mental illness is much akin to having an automotive mechanic diagnose problems with a Spy-In-The-Sky Satellite. He may know electronics, and he may be familiar with running tests, but the schematics will look like Sumerian Script.

The human brain is a complicated computer which can last the user a century or more. Like a computer, things can go wrong. The wiring in the brain, unlike the wiring in a computer is not marked. It has taken years to figure out what part of the brain does what. No one knows what causes a variety of actions that are out of the norm. A person for years could be the nicest, smartest individual you could know. They could be married, have children, be a community fixture and suddenly one day they grab a high powered rifle with a scope, climb into a church steeple and begin shooting people below. If he is captured alive, the inquisition will begin, but no solid answers. He may give vague answers, investigation will reveal maybe he is facing a financial crises, maybe being the pillar of the community was too much, maybe like a computer program, a virus affected a vital part of his brain causing him to do madness.

The money needed  to understand the workings of the brain is sadly miniscule and can only be used to scratch the surface of understanding how a 10 pound piece of muscle, with no outside power, can work. Once we understand how the brain works, we may begin to understand why people do evil. Maybe we can figure out what causes mental illness.

Many will want to use DNA testing to see if there are tendencies to do evil laying dormant in families. This would open an entire Pandoras box. Only 5% of the DNA Helix code has been cracked. The rest of the 95% is considered "junk". Perhaps within this "junk" lies the answer to mental illness, but then again comes ethics and the fear of tampering with the DNA to create a "Super Person".

With research into Mental Illness comes the all too real fear that with each breakthrough to understanding what causes it, comes how to manipulate the brain. Mind altering drugs, surgery, implants, all invented to deal with Mental Illness can be used to increase evil or make someone subservient.

As with Gun Control, there are no easy answers to the question as to how to deal with Mental Illness.

Flirting With Disaster

There are several versions of the text of the Second Amendment, each with slight capitalization and punctuation differences, found in the official documents surrounding the adoption of the Bill of Rights. One version was passed by the Congress, while another is found in the copies distributed to the States and then ratified by them.

As passed by the Congress:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

As ratified by the States and authenticated by Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State:

A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

The right to have arms in English history is believed to have been regarded as a long-established natural right in English law, auxiliary to the natural and legally defensible rights to life. The English Bill of Rights emerged from a tempestuous period in English politics during which two issues were major sources of conflict: the authority of the King to govern without the consent of Parliament and the role of Catholics in a country that was becoming ever more Protestant. Ultimately, the Catholic James II was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution, and his successors, the Protestants William III and Mary II, accepted the conditions that were codified in the Bill. One of the issues the Bill resolved was the authority of the King to disarm its subjects, after James II had attempted to disarm many Protestants, and had argued with Parliament over his desire to maintain a standing (or permanent) army. The bill states that it is acting to restore "ancient rights" trampled upon by James II, though some have argued that the English Bill of Rights created a new right to have arms, which developed out of a duty to have arms. In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), the Supreme Court did not accept this view, remarking that the English right at the time of the passing of the English Bill of Rights was "clearly an individual right, having nothing whatsoever to do with service in the militia" and that it was a right not to be disarmed by the crown and was not the granting of a new right to have arms. The text of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 includes language protecting the right of Protestants against disarmament by the Crown. This document states: "That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law." It also contained text that aspired to bind future Parliaments, though under English constitutional law no Parliament can bind any later Parliament. Nevertheless, the English Bill of Rights remains an important constitutional document, more for enumerating the rights of Parliament over the monarchy than for its clause concerning a right to have arms. The statement in the English Bill of Rights concerning the right to bear arms is often quoted only in the passage where it is written as above and not in its full context. In its full context it is clear that the bill was asserting the right of Protestant citizens not to be disarmed by the King without the consent of Parliament and was merely restoring rights to Protestants that the previous King briefly and unlawfully had removed.

The historical link between the English Bill of Rights and the Second Amendment, which both codify an existing right and do not create a new one, has been acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Although there is little doubt that the writers of the Second Amendment were heavily influenced by the English Bill of Rights, it is a matter of interpretation as to whether they were intent on preserving the power to regulate arms to the states over the federal government (as the English Parliament had reserved for itself against the monarch) or whether it was intent on creating a new right akin to the right of others written into the Constitution (as the Supreme Court recently decided). Some in the U.S. have preferred the "rights" argument arguing that the English Bill of Rights had granted a right. The need to have arms for self-defence was not really in question. Peoples all around the world since time immemorial had armed themselves for the protection of themselves and others, and as organized nations began to appear these arrangements had been extended to the protection of the state. Without a regular army and police force (which in England was not established until 1829), it had been the duty of certain men to keep watch and ward at night and to confront and capture suspicious persons. Every subject had an obligation to protect the king's peace and assist in the suppression of riots.

In no particular order, early American settlers viewed the right to arms and/or the right to bear arms and/or state militias as important for one or more of these purposes:

• deterring tyrannical government;
• repelling invasion;
• suppressing insurrection;
• facilitating a natural right of self-defense;
• participating in law enforcement;
• enabling the people to organize a militia system.

Which of these considerations they thought were most important, which of these considerations they were most alarmed about, and the extent to which each of these considerations ultimately found expression in the Second Amendment is disputed. Some of these purposes were explicitly mentioned in early state constitutions; for example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 asserted that, "the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state"

 

During the 1760s pre-revolutionary period, the established colonial militia was composed of colonists, which included a number who were loyal to British imperial rule. As defiance and opposition to the British rule developed, a distrust of these Loyalists in the militia became widespread among the colonists, known as Patriots, who favored independence from British rule. As a result, these Patriots established independent colonial legislatures to create their own militias that excluded the Loyalists and then sought out to stock up independent armories for their militias. In response to this arms build up, the British Parliament established an embargo on firearms, parts and ammunition on the American colonies.
British and Loyalist efforts to disarm the colonial Patriot militia armories in the early phases of the American Revolution resulted in the Patriot colonists protesting by citing the Declaration of Rights, Blackstone's summary of the Declaration of Rights, their own militia laws and common law rights to self-defense. While British policy in the early phases of the Revolution clearly aimed to prevent coordinated action by the Patriot militia, some have argued that there is no evidence that the British sought to restrict the traditional common law right of self-defense. Patrick J. Charles disputes these claims citing similar disarming by the patriots and challenging those scholars' interpretation of Blackstone. The right of the colonists to arms and rebellion against oppression was asserted, for example, in a pre-revolutionary newspaper editorial in 1769 Boston objecting to the British army suppression of colonial opposition to the Townshend Acts: Instances of the licentious and outrageous behavior of the military conservators of the peace still multiply upon us, some of which are of such nature, and have been carried to such lengths, as must serve fully to evince that a late vote of this town, calling upon its inhabitants to provide themselves with arms for their defense, was a measure as prudent as it was legal: such violences are always to be apprehended from military troops, when quartered in the body of a populous city; but more especially so, when they are led to believe that they are become necessary to awe a spirit of rebellion, injuriously said to be existing therein. It is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence; and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to be made use of when the sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

The armed forces that won the American Revolution consisted of the standing Continental Army created by the Continental Congress, together with various state and regional militia units. In opposition, the British forces consisted of a mixture of the standing British Army, Loyalist Militia and Hessian mercenaries. Following the Revolution, the United States was governed by the Articles of Confederation. Federalists argued that this government had an unworkable division of power between Congress and the states, which caused military weakness, as the standing army was reduced to as few as 80 men. They considered it to be bad that there was no effective federal military crackdown to an armed tax rebellion in western Massachusetts known as Shays' Rebellion. Anti-federalists on the other hand took the side of limited government and sympathized with the rebels, many of whom were former Revolutionary War soldiers. Subsequently, the Philadelphia Convention proposed in 1787 to grant Congress exclusive power to raise and support a standing army and navy of unlimited size. Anti-federalists objected to the shift of power from the states to the federal government, but as adoption of the Constitution became more and more likely, they shifted their strategy to establishing a bill of rights that would put some limits on federal power.

One aspect of the gun control debate is the conflict between gun control laws and the right to rebel against unjust governments. Blackstone in his Commentaries alluded to this right to rebel as the natural right of resistance and self preservation, to be used only as a last resort, exercisable when "the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression". Some believe that the framers of the Bill of Rights sought to balance not just political power, but also military power, between the people, the states and the nation, as Alexander Hamilton explained in 1788:

[I]f circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude[,] that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens.

 Struggling under the inefficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, delegates from Virginia and Maryland assembled at the Mount Vernon Conference in March 1785 to fashion a remedy. The following year, at a meeting in Annapolis, Maryland, 12 delegates from five states (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia) met and drew up a list of problems with the current government model. At its conclusion, the delegates scheduled a follow-up meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for May 1787 to present solutions to these problems, such as the absence of:

• interstate arbitration processes to handle quarrels between states;
• sufficiently trained and armed intrastate security forces to suppress insurrection;
• a national militia to repel foreign invaders.

It quickly became apparent that the solution to all three of these problems required shifting control of the states' militias to the federal congress and giving that congress the power to raise a standing army. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution codified these changes by allowing the Congress to do the following:

• provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States;
• raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;
• provide and maintain a navy;
• make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
• provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
• provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Some representatives mistrusted proposals to enlarge federal powers, because they were concerned about the inherent risks of centralizing power. Federalists, including James Madison, initially argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary, sufficiently confident that the federal government could never raise a standing army powerful enough to overcome a militia. Federalist Noah Webster argued that an armed populace would have no trouble resisting the potential threat to liberty of a standing army. Anti-federalists, however, advocated amending the Constitution with clearly defined and enumerated rights providing more explicit constraints on the new government. Many Anti-federalists feared the new federal government would choose to disarm state militias. Federalists countered that in listing only certain rights, unlisted rights might lose protection. The Federalists realized there was insufficient support to ratify the Constitution without a bill of rights and so they promised to support amending the Constitution to add a bill of rights following the Constitution's adoption. This compromise persuaded enough Anti-federalists to vote for the Constitution, allowing for ratification. The Constitution was declared ratified June 21, 1788, when nine of the original thirteen states had ratified it. The remaining four states later followed suit, although the last two states, North Carolina and Rhode Island, ratified only after Congress had passed the Bill of Rights and sent it to the states for ratification. James Madison drafted what ultimately became the Bill of Rights, which was proposed by the first Congress on June 8, 1789, and was adopted on December 15, 1791.

Meaning of "well regulated militia"

The term "regulated" means "disciplined" or "trained". In Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[t]he adjective 'well-regulated' implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline and training."
In Federalist No. 29, Alexander Hamilton suggested that well-regulated refers not only to "organizing", "disciplining", and "training" the militia, but also to "arming" the militia:

This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower the Union "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by congress."

A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss.

"If a well regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security...confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority...(and) reserving to the states...the authority of training the militia".

Meaning of "the right of the People"

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Heller, stated:

Nowhere else in the Constitution does a “right” attributed to “the people” refer to anything other than an individual right. What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention “the people,” the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset. This contrasts markedly with the phrase “the militia” in the prefatory clause. As we will describe below, the “militia” in colonial America consisted of a subset of “the people”— those who were male, able bodied, and within a certain age range. Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only the right to “keep and bear Arms” in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the operative clause’s description of the holder of that right as “the people”.

Justice John Paul Stevens countered in his dissent:

When each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia. So far as appears, no more than that was contemplated. But the Court itself reads the Second Amendment to protect a “subset” significantly narrower than the class of persons protected by the First and Fourth Amendments; when it finally drills down on the substantive meaning of the Second Amendment, the Court limits the protected class to “law-abiding, responsible citizens”.

Meaning of "keep and bear arms"

In Heller the majority rejected the view that the term "to bear arms" implies only the military use of arms:

Before addressing the verbs “keep” and “bear,” we interpret their object: “Arms.” The term was applied, then as now, to weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity. Thus, the most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have weapons.” At the time of the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry.” In numerous instances, “bear arms” was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an organized militia. Nine state constitutional provisions written in the 18th century or the first two decades of the 19th, which enshrined a right of citizens “bear arms in defense of themselves and the state” again, in the most analogous linguistic context—that “bear arms” was not limited to the carrying of arms in a militia. The phrase “bear Arms” also had at the time of the founding an idiomatic meaning that was significantly different from its natural meaning: “to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight” or “to wage war.” But it unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition “against,”. Every example given by petitioners’ amici for the idiomatic meaning of “bear arms” from the founding period either includes the preposition “against” or is not clearly idiomatic. In any event, the meaning of “bear arms” that petitioners and Justice Stevens propose is not even the (sometimes) idiomatic meaning. Rather, they manufacture a hybrid definition, whereby “bear arms” connotes the actual carrying of arms (and therefore is not really an idiom) but only in the service of an organized militia. No dictionary has ever adopted that definition, and we have been apprised of no source that indicates that it carried that meaning at the time of the founding. Worse still, the phrase “keep and bear Arms” would be incoherent. The word “Arms” would have two different meanings at once: “weapons” (as the object of “keep”) and (as the object of “bear”) one-half of an idiom. It would be rather like saying “He filled and kicked the bucket” to mean “He filled the bucket and died.”

In a dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Stevens said:

The Amendment’s text does justify a different limitation: the “right to keep and bear arms” protects only a right to possess and use firearms in connection with service in a state-organized militia. Had the Framers wished to expand the meaning of the phrase “bear arms” to encompass civilian possession and use, they could have done so by the addition of phrases such as “for the defense of themselves”.

The Rise of The Silencers

It has become more and more apparent the Conservative Base has an ulterior motive to silence those who disagree with their views. Many people on Facebook have stated upon arguing with a Conservative, they are suddenly report to and shut down by Facebook. One Conservative Page even states they will resort to posting compromising photos and statements regardless if they are true or not to discredit anyone who disagrees with them. They claim it is fun.

This is not fun, this is blatant censorship. This is one ideology attempting to harass and silence another simply because they do not agree. The Conservative base has one goal and on goal only; for the total control of the United States.

All one has to do is follow their legislation, what they say, and the statements made by their followers.

Should the Conservative Base get their wish and gain total control of the Government, their rein will not last long for they will simply disintegrate into chaos and inefficiency. Their nightmare of the U.N. invading the United States will come true for the U.N. will have to step in to restore order. The Financial Industry will collapse into a global depression which will last for years.